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Abstract
We propose a new simple trace logic that can be used to specify local
security properties, i.e. security properties that refer to a single participant
of the protocol specification. Our technique allows a protocol designer
to provide a formal specification of the desired security properties, and
integrate it naturally into the design process of cryptographic protocols.
Furthermore, the logic can be used for formal verification. We illustrate
the utility of our technique by exposing new attacks on the well studied
protocol TMN.
Revision history: Nov 5 2004. Comments: fixed typos.
Revision history: Nov 30 2004. Comments: added (variable)
events Definition 5 , update bindings in execution, Definition 8,
removed Implementation section.
1 Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are typically designed to meet security goals such as
authentication and confidential key exchange. These goals, usually called secu-
rity properties, can be correctly accomplished if some of the values exchanged
during the protocol run satisfy, for instance, classical properties like authentic-
ity, confidentiality, or freshness.
Often, the specification of security properties is carried out by writing of
“global” security properties. These security specifications do not depend from
∗We would like to thank Cabernet and the EYES Project (IST- 2001-34734) for their
support of this work.
1
any principal’s point of view. Thus, to refer to a specific principal, global
security properties are usually defined using extra protocol events [8, 11].
In this paper, on the other hand, we propose a logic that can be used to
express local security properties, i.e. properties that refer to the specification
of one agent, namely the agent which they belong to. As we show in the
following sections, local security properties are expressive enough to assert the
properties that are commonly desired for cryptographic protocols (e.g., freshness
of a nonce.)
The advantage of local properties is that they allow a designer to specify
the security properties that should hold, according to each participant, at each
protocol execution point. For instance, a property like freshness of a nonce
can be specified as a formula that is connected directly to the corresponding
participant who receives that nonce. Furthermore, since these formulae corre-
spond to each principal, they depend only on information of that principal, as
opposed to a global formula that can depend on the whole network state. Thus,
a local formula can be bound to each principal and then be “plugged in” into
any other network specification. This enables potential composability of the
specifications.
Consequently, using local properties, it is possible to integrate the specifica-
tion of the (logical) security properties that a protocol has to meet within the
(algorithmic) specification of the protocol itself. This yields an integrated tech-
nique for protocol engineering that combines tightly the design and the analysis
phase, resulting in a shorter design-verification feedback loop.
We illustrate our approach by studying the TMN protocol [10] for which we
have found two new attacks.
Plan of the paper. In Section 2, we describe our security protocol model.
Then, in Section 3 we introduce our trace logic language. In Section 4, the
TMN protocol is studied and some novel attacks upon it are presented. In
Section 5 elaborates the related work and finally conclusions and future work
are discussed in Section 6.
2 Protocol Model
A protocol step is usually specified using the standard notation A → B : M .
Here, M is a message built from:
• atomic terms, that is constants (written in lowercase) and variables (which
are capitalized). Constants may be nonces (e.g. na) or agent identities
(e.g. a). A special constant ε denotes the intruder.
• constructed terms, that is a finite application of operators encryption MK ,
pairing M1,M2, hashing h(M) and finally public key pk(M) over atomic
terms.
However, the A → B : M notation is unsuitable for formal verification. In fact,
in a protocol step, two different events take place: A sends message M , and B
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receives message M ′. In presence of an intruder, M might not be equal to M ′.
Moreover, not even the identities of the correspondent communication parties
may be the same (i.e., A sends to B′ and B receives from A′.) It is therefore
convenient to take an approach that considers separately each agent’s point of
view; this is the idea of protocol roles.
Definition 1 A protocol role is a pair 〈A, [M1⋄B1, ...,Mn⋄Bn]〉, where A,B1, ..., Bn
are variables, ⋄ ∈ {⊳, ⊲} and M1, ...,Mn are messages. 
Given a protocol role 〈A, [M1 ⋄B1, ...,Mn ⋄Bn]〉, A is called the identity of
the role, while elements Mi ⋄Bi, i = 1..n are the actions of the role: M ⊲B is a
send action, while M ⊳B is a receive action.
Protocol roles in a security protocol often receive (self explanatory) names
such as initiator, responder and server. For example,
responder(A,B,Na) = 〈B, [pk(Na) ⊳ A]〉 (1)
defines a responder role in which there is only one action, the receipt of Na from
A.
Notice that in (1), the variables A,B,Na are still uninstantiated (we borrow
this concept from logic programming: as long as no value is assigned to a vari-
able, we call it uninstantiated, and instantiated otherwise.) In fact, a protocol
role is parametric, thus representing a template. By appropriately (partially) in-
stantiating a finite number of protocol roles, a system scenario can be obtained:
Definition 2 A system scenario is a multiset of (partially) intantiated protocol
roles.
Typically, a system scenario determines how many sessions are present and
which agents play which roles. For instance, the system scenario
{responder(A,b,Na), responder(C,d,Nc)}
(where responder is the role defined above) defines a system scenario with two
responders (notice that there are no corresponding initiators), one played by
b and the other by d. Uninstantiated variables represent unknown values: for
example, variable A in the first responder role represents the (unknown) com-
municating party of b.
2.1 Trace Semantics
Executions of system scenarios are described using traces, which are in turn
composed of events, i.e. single actions performed by an agent.
Definition 3 An event is a pair 〈A : M ⋄ B〉 where A,B are agent’s names,
⋄ ∈ {⊳, ⊲} and M is a message. 
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The event 〈A : M ⊲ B〉 should be read as “agent A sends message M with
intended destination B”. On the other hand, 〈B : M ⊳ A〉 stands for “agent B
receives message M apparently from A”.
To analyze the protocol, we combine the system scenario with the usual
Dolev-Yao intruder [5], who can perform the usual actions: intercept and learn
any sent message, store the information contained in intercepted messages for
later use, and introduce into the system new messages forged using information
the intruder knows. The information obtained by the intruder is stored in a set
of terms K called the intruder’s knowledge1
Now we are ready to describe the execution of a system scenario, represented
by the notion of a run.
Definition 4 Let S be a system scenario, and K be the intruder’s initial knowl-
edge, consisting of constants representing agents identities and their public keys.
Let tr be an initial empty trace. A run of S is a trace obtained by a reiterated
sequence of the following steps:
1. a non-empty role in S is chosen nondeterministically, and its first action
p is removed from it. Let a be the identity of the chosen role.
2. if p = t ⊲ y, then:
(a) t is added to the knowledge of the intruder, K := K ∪ {t}
(b) event e = 〈a : p〉 is added to tr, tr := tr · e
3. if p = t ⊳ y, then:
(a) it is checked if the intruder ε can generate t using the knowledge K2,
if so, then event e = 〈a : p〉 is added to the trace: tr := tr · e.
(b) If ε cannot generate such a message, then the run stops.

3 A Trace Logic
In this section we introduce a trace logic language for defining local security
properties.
Definition 5 A trace logic formula is generated according to the following gram-
mar:
1Because of the symbolic nature of the analyzer, in practice an event can contain variables,
which stand for something the intruder can generate (see [3] for details.)
2We adopt Millen and Shmatikov’s constraint solving procedure [13] for checking if the
intruder can generate a term t using knowledge K. This procedure may involve instantiation
of variables in t or K; for example, t may unify with a term in K, representing that t is already
in K, i.e., is already known by the intruder (see [13] for details.)
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F ::= true | false | F1 ∧ F2 | F1 ∨ F2 | F1 → F2 | ∀e ∈ tr : F
| ∃e ∈ tr : F |∃t : F |¬F |e1 = e2 | e1  e2
where e, e1 and e2 are (variable) events. 
The conjunction of two formulae has the usual significance: F1 ∧ F2 is true
if both F1 and F2 are true; the disjunction operator ∨ and implication → are
analogous. On the other hand, the meaning of constructors ∀e ∈ tr : F and
∃e ∈ tr : F is non-standard. Since a trace formula is going to be evaluated on
a certain input trace, constructors ∀ and ∃ allow us to reason about the events
in the input trace: ∀e ∈ tr : F asserts that every event e in the input trace
satisfies formula F , while ∃e ∈ tr : F express that some event in the input
trace satisfies formula F . Notice that tr is not a variable, it is just part of the
operators name to emphasize that e ranges over the system trace. Even though
this gives a “temporal” flavor to our logic, we anticipate that these constructors
only operate on past events, recorded in the input trace (see later). Formula ¬F
has the usual meaning of negation. Differently from the above operators, ∃t : F
quantifies t over all messages and agents space. Finally, predicates e1 = e2 and
e1  e2 allow us to compare events: the former asserts equality, and the latter
subterm inclusion.
While the choice of these constructors may seem rather ad hoc for our pur-
poses, we believe this logic can in fact be quite expressive, and allow us to assert
a fairly large set of interesting security properties, as will be shown later.
Next, we define the precise meaning of a trace logic formula.
Definition 6 Let F be the set of well-formed trace logic formulae, and TR be
the set of traces, then the semantic function [[·]]· : F × TR → {true, false} is
defined as follows:
[[true]] tr = true
[[false]] tr = false
[[F1 ∧ F2]] tr = true iff [[F1]] tr = [[F2]] tr = true
[[F1 ∨ F2]] tr = true iff [[F1]] tr = true or [[F2]] tr = true
[[F1 → F2]] tr = true iff [[F1]] tr implies [[F2]] tr
[[∀e ∈ tr : F ]] tr =true iff, for each event x of tr, [[F [x/e]]] tr = true
[[∃e ∈ tr : F ]] tr =true iff, for some event x of tr, [[F [x/e]]] tr = true
[[∃t : F ]] tr =true iff, for some message or agent x, [[F [x/t]]] tr = true
[[¬F ]] tr = true iff [[F ]] tr = false
[[e1 = e2]] tr = true iff event e1 is equal to event e2
[[t1  t2]] tr = true iff, if t1 is a subterm of t2

Here, F [x/y] is the result of substituting each occurrence of y with x in F .
For the sake of notation’s simplicity, we assume that all variables that are
not explicitly quantified are existentially quantified (over the set of messages
and agents). This simplifies the notation considerably.
In the future, we plan to endow our logic with a proof system that allow
us to relate proofs of formulae with the intended meaning given by [[·]]·. In
the present work, we are more interested in exploring the expressive power of
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security specifications; We plan to continue this work by addressing the issue of
using our logic for automatic formal verification.
3.1 Appending local security properties to protocol roles
Now, we are ready to combine the definition of protocol roles and local security
properties to obtain extended protocol roles and extended system scenarios. In-
tuitively, the idea is to embed the logical security properties within the protocol
specification.
Definition 7 An extended protocol role is a triple 〈A, [M1 ⋄ B1 : F1, ...,Mn ⋄
Bn : Fn]〉, where {A,B1, ..., Bn} ⊂ V ar, M1, ...,Mn are messages, ⋄ ∈ {⊳, ⊲}
and F1, ..., Fn are trace logic formulae. 
Intuitively, adding a formula Fi after a protocol role action means that Fi
must hold after the execution of the action. Notice that instantiation of an
extended protocol role also affects the variables of an attached local security
property. This formalizes the notion of a security property being ‘local’, that
is a security specification that takes into account the principal’s point of view.
Also, Fi is going to be evaluated w.r.t. the system trace, which contains the
events up to at that precise execution time. This, as we already mentioned,
illustrates the “past flavour” nature of our formulae.
Similarly, we can define an extended system scenario as a multiset of (par-
tially instantiated) extended protocol roles.
3.2 Verifying the local security properties
To evaluate the local security properties, we extend the Definition 8 to the
extended system scenarios introduced in last section:
Definition 8 Let S be an extended system scenario, and K be the intruder’s
initial knowledge, consisting of constants representing agents identities and their
public keys. Let tr be an initial empty trace. A run of S is a trace obtained by
a reiterated sequence of the following steps:
1. a non-empty role in S is chosen nondeterministically, and its first action
p is removed from it. Let a be the identity of the chosen role.
2. if p = t ⊲ y : F , then:
(a) if [[F ]]tr holds, then update the resulting bindings (which appear from
the existencially quantified variables) and continue. Otherwise, the
run stops.
(b) t is added to the knowledge of the intruder ε, K := K ∪ {t}
(c) event e = 〈a : p〉 is added to tr, tr := tr · e
3. if p = t ⊳ y : F , then:
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(a) it is checked if the intruder ε can generate t using the knowledge
K (see below), if so, then event e = 〈a : p〉 is added to the trace:
tr := tr · e.
(b) if [[F ]]tr holds, then continue. Otherwise, the run stops.
(c) If ε cannot generate such a message, or ε simply decides to finish the
execution, then the run stops.

For example, consider the role:
responder(B, A, Na) = 〈B, [Na ⊳ A : F ]〉
where F = ∃e : e = 〈A : Na ⊲ B〉.
After the responder B receives the nonce Na, F checks that A had sent Na
to B before. Now, consider the singleton scenario {responder(b,A,Na)}. In this
scenario, there is only one honest responder role, played by b. Now, suppose
this responder role receives, from the intruder ε, a nonce ni as Na. Therefore,
according to Definition 8, we have trace tr = 〈ε : ni ⊲ b〉. The next step involves
evaluation of [[F ]]tr to see if the local security property F holds: clearly, we can
see that [[∃e : e = 〈A : Na ⊲ b〉]]〈ε : ni ⊲ b〉 evaluates to true, assigning ε to A and
ni to Na.
4 A Case Study: the TMN protocol
We apply our technique to a well known case study, the TMN protocol [10]. This
protocol has been thoroughly studied, see for example [16, 14, 9]. However, in
this section we present some vulnerabilities that we believe no one has noticed
before.
4.1 Original Version
The original version of TMN was proposed for achieving key distribution be-
tween two users:
Message 1. A → S : A,S,B, {R1}pk(S)
Message 2. S → B : S,B,A
Message 3. B → S : B,S,A, {R2}pk(S)
Message 4. S → A : S,A,B, v(R1,R2)
We denote Vernam encryption by v(t1, t2)
3. Here, keys R1 and R2 are sent
from A and B to S, respectively. After Message 4 is received, A can obtain R2,
thus making R2 the shared key between A and B.
3We currently model Vernam encryption as normal symmetric encryption, and not as full
exclusive xor.
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4.1.1 TMN protocol roles.
The first step in our design and verification technique is to obtain the protocol
roles from the standard notation:
• Initiator: 〈A, [A,S,B, {R1}pk(S) ⊲ S : F1, S, A,B, v(R1,R2) ⊳ S : F2]〉
• Responder: 〈B, [S,B,A ⊳ S : F3, B, S,A, {R2}pk(S) ⊲ S : F4]〉
• Server: 〈S, [A,S,B, {R1}pk(S)⊳A : F5, S, B,A⊲B : F6, B, S,A, {R2}pk(S)⊳
B : F7, S, A,B, v(R1,R2) ⊲ A : F8]〉
This translation can be tedious and error-prone when protocols get large;
however, we believe this step can be mostly automated (eg. by a tool assisting
the user.)
The original version of TMN suffers from several secrecy attacks over R2
above, as exposed for instance in [9]. Thus, we will concentrate on two modified
versions of the protocol.
4.2 First modification
A replay attack against TMN was exposed by Simmons [18]. The attack exploits
the fact that the messages to the server from A and B (Message 1 and Message
3) can be replayed. To solve this defficiency, Tatebayashi and Matsuzaki intro-
duce timestamps in messages 1 and 3 [10]:
Message 1. A → S : A,S,B, {TA,R1}pk(S)
Message 2. S → B : S,B,A
Message 3. B → S : B,S,A, {TB,R2}pk(S)
Message 4. S → A : S,A,B, v(R1,R2)
In this new protocol, after receiving TA and TB, the server can check for the
timeliness of these timestamps. According to Tatebayashi and Matsuzaki, this
new protocol version guarantess the freshness of R1 and R2. To check if this is
true, we can specify the freshness requirements of R1 and R2 as a local security
properties of server S:
FreshRi = ∀e ∈ tr : last event(e) ∨ ¬(Ri  msg(e)) (for i = 1, 2)
Where primitive msg(·) projects the message of an event, defined as msg(〈x :
m ⋄ y〉) = m and predicate last event(e) is a primitive that is true iff e is
the last event of trace tr. The definition of this primitive is straightforward:
[[last event(e)]] tr = true iff tr = tr′ · e. FreshR1 and FreshR2 are expressing
that R1 and R2, respectively, are fresh.
The last step involves deciding where to put FreshR1 and FreshR2 in the
server role. This is easy: we make the decision that the formulae for checking
the freshness of the received values should be placed as soon as the values are
received. Thus, FreshR1 can be put as F5, that is, after R1 is received. Similarly,
we set FreshR2 as F7.
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4.3 First novel attack
After verification, we found a violation of formula F5 (that is, freshness of R1).
The attack is reported in Table 1.
Table 1: R1 freshness attack. ε(s) is ε masquerading as s. α and β denote two
different runs.
Message α.1. a→ ε(s) : a, s, b, {ta, r1}pk(s)
Message α.1′. ε(a)→ s : a, s, b, {te1, re}pk(s)
Message α.2. s→ b : s, b, a
Message α.3. b→ ε(s) : b, s, a, {tb, r2}pk(s)
Message α.3′. ε(b)→ s : b, s, a, {ta, r1}pk(s)
Message α.4. s→ ε(a) : s, a, b, v(re, r1)
Message β.1. ε(a)→ s : a, s, b, {te2, r1}pk(s)
In this attack, the intruder starts replacing messages α.1 with α.1′ and α.3
with α.3′, and finally obtains r1 from message α.4. But, when it wants to use it
in a new run β, even if the intruder uses a new (not expired) timestamp te2, the
formula F5 does not hold since r1 is not fresh (note that s is the same server,
involved in both runs α and β). It is important to notice why this attack repre-
sents a vulnerability of the protocol. According to Tatebayashi and Matsuzaki,
the server has to check for the validity of the timestamps in order to guarantee
the freshness of R1 and R2; as we can see in this attack, this is not sufficient.
To the best of our knowledge, this vulnerability was never exposed before.
4.4 Second modification
A modification to assure authentication of the initiator and responder to the
server consists in using SA and SB, shared secrets between S and A and B
respectively, in the following manner:
Message 1. A → S : A,S,B, {TA, SA,R1}pk(S)
Message 2. S → B : S,B,A
Message 3. B → S : B,S,A, {TB, SB,R2}pk(S)
Message 4. S → A : S,A,B, v(R1,R2)
After receiving messages 1 and 3, the server can authenticate A and B,
respectively, since (by assumption) secrets SA and SB are shared only between
the server and the respective agents. To check if the protocol accomplishes the
authentication goal of A and B to S, we translate this in a formula that states
that if S received a message M apparently from A (resp. B), then it was really
sent by A (B). Server S authenticates A after receiving the first message, so at
that point we set our formula: F5 = ∃e : e = 〈A : A,S,B, {TA, SA,R1}pk(S)⊲S〉.
Similarly, S authenticates B after the third message: F7 = ∃e : e = 〈B :
B,S,A, {TB, SB,R2}pk(S) ⊲ S〉.
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We performed verification with some test scenarios and did not find any trace
that violates the above security requirements. Thus, we can regard the protocol
to be secure for the system scenarios we tested; of course, bigger scenarios can
be tested to increase confidence about the protocol security.
4.5 Mutual authentication
Even though Tatebayashi and Matsuzaki do not state the mutual authentication
of A and B, it is interesting to consider this case (Lowe and Roscoe [9] also
discuss this.) We can translate this requirement by redefining two formulae,
namely F3 and F2. We define F3 to express the local security property of A to
B and F2 expressing the authentication of B to A:
• M authenticity of A to B: F3 = ∃e : e = 〈A : A,S,B, {TA, SA, R1}pk(S) ⊲
S〉;
• M authenticity of B to A: F2 = ∃e : e = 〈B : B,S,A, {TB, SB, R2}pk(S) ⊲
S〉.
Proceeding with verification, we found traces that violate F2 and F3. The
attack trace for F3 is straightforward, consisting in only one message, sent from
ε(s) to b: s, b, a. But this is sufficient to violate formula F3, since when b receives
s, b, a she wants to check if a sent a, s, b, {ta, sa, r1}pk(s), which she did not (this
attack is similar to attack 7.1 in [9].)
4.6 Novel authentication attacks
In Table 2 we report two attacks that violate F2.
Table 2: B to A authentication attacks
α.1. a→ ε(s) : a, s, b, {ta, sa, r1}pk(s) α.1.a→ ε(s) : a, s, b, {ta, sa, r1}pk(s)
α.2. ε(s)→ b : s, b, ε β.1.ε→ s : ε, s, a, {te, se, re1}pk(s)
α.3. b→ ε(s) : b, s, ε, {tb, sb, r2}pk(s) β.2.s→ ε(a) : s, a, ε
β.1. ε(a)→ s : a, s, b, {ta, sa, r1}pk(s) β.3.ε(a)→ s : a, s, ε, {ta, sa, r1}pk(s)
β.2. s→ ε(b) : s, b, a β.4.s→ ε : s, ε, a, v(re1, r1)
β.3. ε(b)→ s : b, s, a, {tb, sb, r2}pk(s) α.4.ε(s)→ a : s, a, b, v(r1, re1)
β.4. s→ ε(a) : s, a, b, v(r1, r2)
α.4. ε(s)→ a : s, a, b, v(r1, r2)
The attack of Table 2 (left side) is successful since the intruder can manip-
ulate the first three non-encrypted fields. Notice how F2 is violated: when a
receives message α.4, b never sent message b, s, a, {tb, sb, r2}pk(s). The attack
reported in Table 2 (right side) is stronger, since the principal b is not alive in
the run of a.
We believe these attacks over this modified version of the TMN protocol
have never been reported before in the literature.
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5 Related Work
In this section we discuss some related work. In [16], Roscoe identifies two ways
of specifying protocol security goals: firstly, using extensional specifications,
and secondly using intensional specifications. An extensional specification
describes the intended service provided by the protocol in terms of behavioural
equivalence [6, 1, 17]. On the other hand, an intensional specification describes
the underlying mechanism of a procotol, in terms of states or events [2, 21, 16,
19, 15, 7].
The approach presented in this paper belongs to the spectrum of intensional
specifications, and is related to [16, 19]. In [19], a requirement specification lan-
guage is proposed. This language is useful for specifying sets of requirements for
classes of protocol; the requirements can be mapped onto a particular protocol
instance, which can be later verified using their tool, called NRL Protocol An-
alyzer. This approach has been subsequently used to specify the GDOI secure
multicast protocol [12].
In [16], Roscoe presents a method for describing the underlying mechanism
of a protocol, using a CSP specification. The method consists of four steps:
Firstly, one identifies an execution point of the protocol that should not be
reached without a corresponding legitimate run having occurred. Secondly, one
describes the possible sequences of messages that should have occurred before
this execution point; thirdly, one creates a specification which groups all the
CSP processes modelling the protocol participants (this step is similar to our
scenario setting). Finally, one verifies the specification using FDR. This method
has been also used by Lowe in [9].
The approaches just mentioned employ languages specifying security prop-
erties in a global fashion, as opposed to our technique which deals with local
security properties.
In [4], Cremers, Mauw and de Vink present another logic for specifying local
security properties. Similarly to us, in [4] the authors define the message au-
thenticity property by referring to the variables occurring in the protocol role.
In addition, in [4], it is defined a new kind of authentication, called synchoniza-
tion, which is then compared with the Lowe’s intensional specification. The logic
presented in this paper cannot handle the specification of the synchronization
authentication. In fact, we cannot handle the weaker notion of injective authen-
tication, since we cannot match corresponding events in a trace. However, we
believe we can extend our logic to support these properties. Briefly, this could
be achieved by decorating the different runs with label identifiers and adding a
primitive to reason about events that happenned before others in a trace.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have developed a trace logic for expressing local security properties. Using
this trace logic, the protocol designer can specify precisely the (local) security
properties a protocol should satisfy to accomplish the security goals for which
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it has been designed.
The main differences between our approach and the ones mentioned in Sec-
tion 5 can be summarized as follows:
1. Our trace logic formulae are local to the participants, in the sense that
are dependent to the principal’s point of view, instead of global to the
protocol specification. This allow us to define properties more precisely,
in the sense of what should hold for each principal at each execution step.
Furthermore, our technique can be used to integrate the specification
within the design of a cryptographic protocol. Methodologically, this al-
lows for the integration of the verification phase within the design one,
speeding up the feedback from the verification, and providing the basis
for an integrated environment for protocol engineering.
2. Without having to use temporal operators, the logic we presented can
express classical security properties including freshness and authenticity
of the exchanged values during a protocol run.
3. Our logic is applied directly to the protocol messages. This allow us to
reason about (local) security properties without having to use artificial
event messages.
As future work, we plan to apply the methodology to more complex case
studies, such as multicast protocols e.g. LKH group communications protocol
[20]. We also plan to study how to compose local security specifications: we
believe this is a very important advantage of our approach over the other global
ones.
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